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This is the ﬁ  rst of two articles in the October 
2005 issue on ways to create practical markets 
for vaccines.
“I
n the time it takes you to 
read this preface, 100 people 
will die of diseases that can 
already be prevented with vaccines, 
and 150 more will die of malaria, HIV 
or tuberculosis [1].” So begins Making 
Markets for Vaccines, a report from the 
Center for Global Development (CGD) 
in Washington, D.C. that is being 
vigorously promoted to leaders of the 
G8 and foundations as a blueprint 
for how to spend billions of dollars in 
donations to end the economic and 
personal burdens of so much suffering 
and loss. 
In order to stop children “dying 
at the rate of an average-sized high 
school every hour,” the report 
offers a plan that is “simple and 
practical”—make an “advanced market 
commitment” (AMC) to purchase the 
equivalent of the revenues that the 
big multinational ﬁ  rms would receive 
from major Western drugs, once the 
vaccine or vaccines are discovered, 
tested, and brought to market. This 
commitment, says the report, will 
induce companies to start investing 
serious research funds and unleash the 
creative powers of their large research 
teams to discover new, effective 
vaccines. In return for a large buyout 
of a few billion dollars, the company 
or companies that win the windfall 
contract(s) would commit thereafter 
to sell all doses at a very low, cost-plus 
price (i.e., basic cost plus a small proﬁ  t 
margin). Contracts would also depend 
on poor countries participating, paying 
a co-payment of about a dollar a dose, 
and meeting other requirements. The 
result will be that hundreds of millions 
of children will get immunized against 
deadly diseases so that they can learn, 
create, and unleash the productive 
potential in poor nations to 
transform themselves. 
The AMC, which is 
not like a market in most 
ways, becomes a long-
term contract best aimed 
at late-stage and existing 
vaccines, not at research for 
nonexistent vaccines. An 
advanced commitment is 
a slower, less efﬁ  cient way 
to incentivize research to 
discover an effective new 
vaccine than direct research 
support. As a complement 
to public and charitable 
funding of research and 
development, an advanced 
commitment can buy many 
more million doses, to save 
millions more lives, at a 
much lower price because 
the risk and cost of research 
and development are being 
borne by the funders. While 
advanced commitments are 
a good idea for overcoming 
long delays due to patent 
enforcements, what leaders 
need is a different kind of report on 
how to make a big splash and a real 
difference with between US$1 billion 
and $5 billion, a report that outlines 
how advanced commitments can be 
most effective in saving lives and how 
the key issues in the manufacturing, 
organization, and delivery of vaccines 
in poor regions can be addressed. I 
will ﬁ  rst identify the problems in what 
could be called the “core draft” of 
the CGD model by Michael Kremer, 
who holds the Gates professorship at 
Harvard, and then comment brieﬂ  y on 
how the ﬁ  nal report to leaders fudges 
and qualiﬁ  es Kremer’s model with add-
ons to please all readers, so that what is 
being proposed becomes less coherent 
and more difﬁ  cult to pin down. 
The Context
As a professor of comparative health-
care systems, I served on the “Pull” 
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Vaccines won’t reach their targets
(Illustration: Emma Burns)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0935
Mechanisms Working Group (the 
Group) that the Gates Foundation 
funded the CGD to manage. Over the 
past several years, the Gates Foundation 
has transformed vaccine and drug 
research and development (R&D) for 
global diseases through bold funding 
and institution-building. These are 
called “push” efforts, because they use 
the direct force of contracts, funds, and 
grants to push along leading projects 
and programs. As a result, over a dozen 
promising new vaccines are entering 
clinical trials, or soon will be. But 
Kremer had proposed using the “pull” 
of a large ﬁ  nancial commitment as 
the way to induce R&D in the private 
sector for neglected diseases (parts 1 
and 2 of [2]). Though this is called an 
“advanced market commitment,” it is 
not a market, but one or a few donors 
making a large purchase. The Group 
should have explored and assessed 
the pros and cons of various pull 
mechanisms, but I felt it increasingly 
became a cheering squad for Kremer’s 
model, which then was applied to 
malaria as the way to supersede the 
many previous efforts by government- 
and foundation-sponsored scientists to 
discover an effective vaccine. The more 
I learned as a neophyte about how weak 
the evidence was that this appealing 
idea would work and the ways it might 
make things worse, the more doubtful 
I became. 
Little Bang for Big Bucks
Two studies were featured in the report 
as proof that advanced commitments 
are a revolutionary technique to 
launch a new era of innovation. 
The study by Finkelstein provides a 
systematic analysis of how advanced 
commitment funding for vaccines 
has affected investments in R&D 
[3]. Finkelstein ﬁ  nds that only large 
ﬁ  rms respond to the inducement, by 
taking an already-discovered vaccine 
off the shelf and testing it, such as 
GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK’s) vaccine 
candidate for malaria with modest, 
short-term efﬁ  cacy [4]. Ironically, this 
is the only candidate mentioned in the 
Group’s report, Making Markets…—yet 
it was push funding for testing, not pull 
inducement, that apparently got GSK 
to take it off the shelf after 15 years, 
and start trials. Finkelstein found that 
small ﬁ  rms, where most innovation is 
taking place, begin to participate later 
in a sustained larger market, which 
this advanced commitment model is 
not designed to create. Finkelstein 
concludes from her large sample that 
“for every $1 permanent increase in 
expected annual market revenue from 
vaccines against a particular disease 
[the CGD design], the pharmaceutical 
industry will spend an additional 6 
cents annually in present discounted 
value on R&D for vaccines against that 
disease” (p. 543 of [3]). 
The other major study cited in the 
CGD report as evidence that a $3 
billion advanced commitment would 
have long, deep pull back to basic 
research (rather than short, shallow 
pull to fund clinical testing) comes to 
the implausible conclusion that just 
a 1% increase in market size leads to 
a 4%–6% increase in new drugs [5]. 
Not a 4- to 6-fold increase in research 
funding (also implausible) but a 4- to 
6-fold increase in actual new drugs! 
This miraculous conclusion is stated 
as if it were fact, when it is based on a 
highly artiﬁ  cial econometric model. 
The model assumes that all individuals 
live indeﬁ  nitely, that there is only one 
ﬁ  rm at any one time with the best-
practice technology, that anticipated 
future market size (not actual size) 
prompts more innovation over long 
periods, and that “new drugs” include 
all generics and all newly approved 
drugs, even though less than 15% 
of the latter are therapeutically 
superior to existing drugs [6,7]. Like 
Finkelstein, the authors sensibly note 
that “pharmaceutical companies may 
respond more to proﬁ  t incentives at the 
later stages of the research process than 
at the earlier stages.” Thus, both studies 
support using advanced commitments 
to encourage late-stage development, 
not basic research to discover new 
drugs or vaccines. 
The studies cited to prove that 
donor-pull will spur companies to 
invest in basic research that might or 
might not discover an effective vaccine 
10–15 years down the road in fact offer 
dubious evidence. Further, the vaccine 
business is technically different from 
drugs, and most of the big companies 
decided years ago to get out of it. Is 
an advanced commitment for one 
vaccine (or one disease—an ambiguity 
that creates further problems) enough 
to get them back into the vaccine 
business? A central problem is that the 
CGD model creates a one-time market 
and does not address sustainability. 
Meanwhile, the few companies that 
have vaccine research teams are already 
being funded directly or through 
public–private partnerships (PPPs), 
often by the Gates Foundation, so that 
an AMC for research is unnecessary. 
Finally, going after a big contract 
designed not to pay a penny until a 
company has invested a decade or 
more in discovery, development, 
testing, and approval is a less cost-
effective way to commit billions of 
dollars than to do what Gates and 
others are doing already: funding the 
best basic research ideas (including 
from private-sector teams), creating 
PPPs and other bridging organizations, 
and bringing the best experts together 
in a global research community. 
Market-induced basic research is 
still less plausible in the CGD model, 
because the more closely one reads 
the text, the less clear it becomes how 
much a company would actually get if 
it were to gamble hundreds of millions 
so that it could discover an effective 
vaccine. The core Kremer model comes 
up with $3 billion to match the average 
sales of an individual top-selling drug 
in order to make investing in research 
as attractive as for other products. But 
then it makes room for second or third 
successful vaccines by other companies, 
among whom the total amount of 
money has to be shared. Contracts also 
depend on the governments of each 
participating poor country agreeing to 
terms as subsidized purchasers. Then 
the ﬁ  nal report shifts the argument 
from an advanced commitment for a 
vaccine to an advanced commitment 
for all vaccines for a given disease. In 
sum, these provisions make it unclear 
how much a company would get after 
years of R&D investments. 
These same provisions also make a 
binding contract impossible, because 
the donor cannot specify what it would 
pay a company if it invests in research 
to discover a new vaccine. And what is a 
company to make of the assurance that 
an advanced commitment will not cost 
the donor a penny until an effective 
vaccine meets the contractual criteria? 
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If the advanced commitment requires 
no set-aside, why should investors 
and companies think it’s real and not 
subject to executive or political change? 
If donors’ ﬁ  nancial commitment is real, 
why not save real lives by committing 
to make an effective vaccine available 
to the world’s poor now, rather than 
possibly save hypothetical lives years 
from now? 
The Scientiﬁ  c Barriers to Vaccines
Besides weak evidence that a $3 billion 
advanced commitment would induce 
basic research, nothing is mentioned 
about the daunting scientiﬁ  c barriers 
to developing a vaccine for either 
malaria or HIV-AIDS. The Kremer 
model assumes that creating a large 
purchase will induce a solution; but 
scientists who have done the research 
say that the scientiﬁ  c obstacles may be 
insurmountable because the targets are 
multiple and evolving. This observation 
leads to a more serious weakness in a 
global competition for a big contract: 
it rewards scientiﬁ  c secrecy rather than 
sharing, whereas the cooperative push 
efforts in recent years have fostered 
partnerships and sharing. Here is a 
stark trade-off. Which is more likely to 
lead to better vaccines faster—ﬁ  erce 
competition for a big future payoff or 
cooperative sponsorship and PPPs? 
The more cooperative government, 
university and nonproﬁ  t research teams 
will probably get nothing under the 
advanced commitment model.
The other big trade-off question was 
(and is): will committing large sums 
to the deep, long pull of an advanced 
commitment mean less money for 
grants and contracts to push vaccine 
development forward? The report 
asserts it would not. I ﬁ  nd that suspect. 
I was told, in support of this assertion, 
that wealthy countries are ready to 
commit billions, and then billions more, 
to eradicating global diseases of the 
poor beyond the multinational scheme 
to buy and administer existing but 
underused vaccines. Is that true? If so, 
why have at least two studies concluded 
that foundations and governments 
(especially European) have not yet 
adequately funded R&D for neglected 
diseases [8,9]? Three billion dollars 
more for research will foster more 
innovation than $3 billion committed as 
an inducement for more research.
The big trade-off question gets 
buried by emphasizing that advanced 
commitments are to be added to 
current push efforts to “complement” 
them, as if committing a few billion 
dollars to “pull” funding has no effect 
on “push” funding. But if it does, the 
CGD report itself documents how 
much more progress has been made, 
for a fraction the cost, through directly 
funded grants and programs. Ironically, 
complementary uses of pull mechanisms 
with push ones were little discussed 
by the Group over the months of 
deliberation. Criticisms of the Kremer 
draft led to softening the ﬁ  nal report 
but not to substantive development of 
synergistic combinations. Those are still 
waiting to be done.
To summarize, the rationale for 
Kremer’s model, which still lies behind 
all the add-ons and qualiﬁ  ers of the 
CGD ﬁ  nal report, assumes that a 
large purchase will unleash innovative 
research to discover effective vaccines 
for the world’s most intransigent 
diseases [10]. It is promoted, as Farlow 
notes of Kremer’s book, “in much the 
same way that some pharmaceutical 
companies promote ‘wonder drugs’: 
emphasizing the positives, burying the 
negatives, and ending up suggesting 
that we now have all the answers…” 
[11]. Neither evidence nor logic 
support the Kremer and CGD model, 
and advanced commitments for early-
stage research can crowd out faster, 
more effective efforts both politically 
and economically. The CGD model 
belies its president’s call for a “global 
commons” in which the best minds 
and teams work together for “a global 
social contract” to beneﬁ  t humanity 
[1,7]. Why is there such a discrepancy 
between the rhetoric and the reality of 
the CGD model?
Designed for Big Pharma
As drafts of the CGD report progressed, 
the number of contractual features and 
one-sided passages that favored the 
multinational corporations made me 
increasingly uncomfortable. Here are 
several examples:
Why is the advanced commitment 
contract designed so that competing 
ﬁ  rms get no money until a new vaccine 
is fully tested and approved? Only big 
Western ﬁ  rms have the cash reserves to 
sink hundreds of millions into research 
to discover and develop new vaccines, 
shutting out smaller companies in Asia, 
the Americas, and Africa. Interim and 
milestone payments were suggested 
but rejected as part of push grants, not 
pull AMCs. There are good reasons for 
using such payments in both initiatives. 
The ﬁ  nal report keeps repeating that 
the process is open to all, but the 
contractual terms allow only cash-rich 
corporations to gamble for years for a 
possible big payoff and exclude future 
biotech companies that discover a 
vaccine after the initial contacts are 
signed. 
Why do the winners get to keep 
patent rights, when these patent 
rights are the principal reason for 
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Table 1. Contrasting Models of Advanced Purchase Commitments
Feature Advanced Commitment for Malaria or 
AIDS: No Effective Vaccine (CGD Model)
Advanced Commitment for Rotavirus or a Disease with an Effective Vaccine 
(Proposed Model)
Primary goal To create incentives for basic research to discover 
effective vaccines and test them for approval
To create a stable, long-term market for an effective vaccine at low, cost-plus prices, 
by paying for licensing rights and manufacturing know-how, as well as a 10-year supply; 
to relieve suffering and death now
IP Sponsor keeps all IP rights Sponsor sells all rights needed to sell vaccine at low price to poorer populations
Cost $3–$5 billion in 2005, compounded at 11% 
thereafter
$1–$3 billion in 2005
Time frame 10–15 years to hopeful success Start now, for 10 years
Payout Nothing until primary goal achieved Start now; multiple payouts to achieve whole-system goals of good delivery systems 
and regional manufacturing capacity
Capacity to deliver Not addressed Central to the design
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020271.t001PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0937
the long delays in getting vaccines to 
poor countries at low prices? Drug 
companies with patent rights do not 
have a good record for sharing and 
building a global commons. Sharing 
and combining vaccines for malaria 
is especially important. A $3 billion 
advanced commitment is supposed to 
be a windfall buyout to shortcut access 
to poor nations, and it should include 
the rights and technical know-how 
needed for ﬂ  exible capacity-building 
for that price. In fact, in many cases 
those rights could probably be bought 
for a tenth of that price. 
What happened to the early 
goal of building up technical and 
manufacturing capacity in each 
continent? Several design features of 
the CGD model mitigate against it. 
Why were principal legal advisers 
to big pharma chosen to do all the 
legal work, rather than a more neutral 
source? They are now coauthors 
with Group members as part of the 
promotional push for the “one true 
answer.” And why are the contractual 
term sheets drawn up by these advisers 
so vague in all the critical places? 
Innovative ﬁ  rms in Korea, India, China, 
Cuba, Brazil, or elsewhere outside the 
big pharma US–UK club are unlikely to 
trust this contractual process. Finally, 
why launch the report in the ofﬁ  ces of 
principal legal advisers to big pharma? 
Why is the cost of an advanced 
commitment set to the sales curves of 
drugs rather than to the sales curves 
of better-selling vaccines? Why does 
the report draw almost exclusively on 
industry-supported data and studies 
for the “facts” on which the advanced 
commitment is based? The result, 
when combined with the other points, 
is a bonanza for big pharma, and the 
text indicates that $3 billion is only a 
starting price, which is likely to increase 
rapidly to between $5 billion and $8 
billion. 
After the big payoff for 200 million 
courses, little is said (or was discussed) 
about how to sustain the vaccine 
effort. Sustainability is a major issue in 
vaccines for the poor; yet all the focus 
here appeared to be on a multi-billion 
dollar payment to big pharma. 
Almost no time was spent analyzing 
the organizational, regulatory, and 
ﬁ  nancial causes of past delays in 
making new vaccines available in poor 
countries. Will a $3 billion buyout solve 
all the sources of delay? Learning from 
the past did not seem to be the point.
Likewise, no time was spent 
understanding the organizational, 
political, and cultural barriers to 
effective delivery of the vaccines, only 
purchasing them. Rather than actually 
delivering vaccines to people, is a 
windfall purchase the real goal here? 
As an expert in health-care delivery, 
I could not endorse a report that 
ignored these issues. 
Why is GSK’s marginally effective 
vaccine candidate mentioned by name 
in the report—and why are the terms 
of contract then made loose enough so 
that a small, hand-picked committee is 
permitted to lower (but not raise!) the 
minimal thresholds for a vaccine to be 
acceptable? 
Answers to such questions were 
brought into focus by the comment 
in Europe of a senior, international 
expert on vaccines and their markets. 
He explained that the major companies 
are running out of markets to sustain 
their rapid growth. That’s why they’re 
turning sexual performance or shyness 
into medical problems. They have 
been looking for years for a way to 
make a proﬁ  table market out of global 
vaccines, and in the CGD group’s 
proposal it looks as if they have found 
a way: “Why don’t they just say they 
want to give GSK $3 billion for their 
marginally effective vaccine?” 
Were members of the CGD group 
being used as agents for this agenda?
Making Markets for Sustainable 
Cheap Vaccines
The reasonable doubts here that led 
me to withhold my endorsement of the 
CGD report do not address a number 
of other serious concerns: how difﬁ  cult, 
for instance, it is to get the buyout 
price, and especially the post-buyout 
price, right years in advance (Box 
1). There are also problems with the 
contracts, the oversight committee, 
and liability issues; problems of 
inequities; and problems with the 
increasingly confused terms of what 
is being proposed—issues taken up in 
more detail elsewhere [12–14]. The G8 
ﬁ  nance ministers have been misadvised 
to write that advanced purchase 
commitments are a potentially 
powerful mechanism to incentivize 
research [15]. But none of these 
problems detracts from my thinking 
that advanced purchase commitments 
are a good idea when applied where 
they work best: on existing vaccines that 
could save millions from suffering and 
dying now. It seems morally dubious for 
a foundation or nation to do otherwise. 
The singular omission in the Grand 
Challenges in Global Health is that they 
do not call for the eradication of all 
the diseases for which effective vaccines 
already exist [16,17]. When millions 
of lives could be saved now, why give 
priority to future lives that might or 
might not be saved?
An advanced commitment as a 
complement to paying for R&D could 
be designed to establish a sustainable, 
long-term market for an effective 
vaccine to eradicate a global disease. 
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Box 1. The Price Is Wrong
Remember the quiz show, “The 
Price is Right,” where contestants 
guessed how much things actually 
cost? A big problem with advanced 
purchase or market commitments 
is that guessing both the payoff 
price and the post-payoff price 
is very difﬁ  cult when attempted 
years before one even knows the 
kind of effective vaccine that will 
be discovered and how it is to be 
administered. 
To be fair to competitors, the 
payoff price should be adjusted 
for how much R&D was paid for 
by governments and foundations, 
because some risk much less 
of their own money, net of tax 
subsidies, than others. The CGD 
price of $15 per course and $3 
billion might be much too high, or 
too low, by 2015. And no adjusters 
are mentioned for external 
subsidies and other factors.
The permanent post-payoff cost 
of manufacturing most vaccines 
in volumes above 10 million units, 
according to information given to 
our Group, is very low, between 
one and ﬁ  ve cents. But a new-age 
biologic vaccine might cost much 
more. The CGD price of $1 per 
course is quite high compared 
to many generic vaccines and 
for many poor governments. But 
then, it might not cover the costs 
of a technically expensive vaccine. 
Both prices can be right, however, 
if an advanced commitment can 
be made for an existing vaccine to 
eradicate a dread disease.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0938
With little risk or private investment 
to pay off, one could commit to 600 
million doses for $3 billion rather than 
200 million doses. The terms should 
build in ﬁ  nancial support as well as 
expert help to strengthen the public 
health delivery systems of recipient 
nations and their capacity to build the 
new vaccine into their budgets and 
planning. The donor could announce 
honestly that it is eradicating a global 
scourge, instead of saying that it might 
do so ten years from now. Licenses 
for low-income markets as well as 
manufacturing know-how would be 
part of the deal, and favoring regional 
manufacturers would be a related goal. 
Through this kind of ﬂ  exible, long-
term contracting focused on delivery 
and capacity-building, an advanced 
commitment could create sustainable, 
whole-systems markets for new vaccines 
that current R&D efforts are pushing 
forward. This is one idea, but we 
need the kind of report I described 
at the beginning, which assesses this 
model along with other forms of 
advanced commitments and push–pull 
combinations.  
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